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AGGREGATION WITH SEQUENTIAL NON-CONVEX PUBLIC - AND 
PRIVATE - SECTOR LABOR SUPPLY DECISIONS 
 
Aleksandar VASILEV  
American University in Bulgaria, Bulgaria  
avasilev@aubg.bg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
This paper explores the problem of non-convex labor supply decisions in an economy with both private 
and public sector jobs. In contrast to Vasilev (2015a), the sectoral labor choice is made in a sequential manner. 
Still, the micro-founded representation obtained from explicit aggregation over homogeneous individuals again 
features different disutility of labor across the two sectors. Thus, there is little merit in the timing of the sectoral 
non-convex labor choice. 
Keywords: indivisible labor; public employment; sequential lottery; aggregation 
JEL Classification: J22, J45 
1. Introduction  
This paper explores the problem of non-convex labor supply decisions in an economy with 
both private and public sector jobs. In contrast to Vasilev (2015a), the sectoral labor choice is made 
in a sequential manner. 
2. Model Setup  
The theoretical setup follows to a great extent Vasilev (2015a), except for the timing of the 
sectoral labor supply decisions. The economy is static, there is no physical capital, and agents face a 
sequential non-convex decision in a two-sector economy. Since the focus is on a one- period world, the 
model abstracts away from technological progress, population growth and uncertainty. There is a 
large number of identical one-member households, indexed by i and distributed uniformly on the [0, 1] 
interval. In the exposition below, we will use small case letters to denote individual variables and 
suppress the index i to save on notation. 
2.1 Households  
Each household maximizes the following utility function 
 
  (1/ ), , [ ] (1 )p g p gMax c h h ln c S ln h h          (2.1) 
 
where c, S, hp, hg denotes private consumption, consumption of the public good, hours worked in the 
private sector, and hours worked in the government sector. The parameter α > 1 measures the relative 
weight of leisure in the utility function. Total consumption is a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
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aggregation of private consumption and consumption of government services, where η > 0 measures the degree 
of substitutability between private and public consumption. Each household is endowed with 1 unit of time that 
can be allocated to work in the private sector, work in the government sector, or leisure 
 
1p gh h I           (2.2) 
 
Labor supply in each sector is assumed to be discrete 0, ,{ } {0, }
p gp gh h h h . In contrast to Vasilev 
(2015a), within the period, each household decides first to look for a job in the private sector, and if unsuccessful, 
will search for work in the public sector. The wage rate per hour worked in the private and public sectors is wp and 
wg, respectively. 
In addition to labor income income, households hold shares in the private firm and receives an equal profit 
share π. Income is subject to a (equal) lump-sum tax t, where t = T, with T denoting aggregate tax revenue. 
Therefore, each household’s budget constraint is 
 
 , ,j j jc w h t j p g                 (2.3) 
 
Households act competitively by taking the wage rates {wp, wg }, aggregate outcomes {C, S, Hp, Hg } and 
lump-sum taxes {T } as given. Each household chooses {cj, hp, hg } to maximize (2.1) s.t. (2.2)-(2.3). 
2.2 Firms  
There is a representative firm in the private sector producing a homogeneous final consumption 
good, which uses labor as an only input. The production function is given by 
 
, 0, 0,( ) ( 0) ,
ppY F H F F F H               (2.4) 
 
where the last assumption is imposed to proxy a capacity constraint. The firm acts competitively by taking the 
hourly wage rate {wp}, aggregate outcomes {C, S, Hg } and policy variable {T } as given. Accordingly, {Hp} is 
chosen to maximize static aggregate profit: 
 
( ) ,p p pmaxF H w H          (2.5) 
0pH   
 
Given the assumption imposed on the production function, in equilibrium, the firm will 
realize positive economic profit. 
2.3 Government  
The government hires employees to provide public services and levies lum-sum taxes on households to 
finance the government wage bill. The technology of the public good provision uses labor Hg as an input, which is 
remunerated at a non-competitive wage rate wg = γwp. Parameter γ ≥ 1 will measure the fixed gross mark-up of 
government sector wage rate over the private sector one. Such a mark-up is a stylized fact for the major EU 
economies, e.g. Vasilev (2015b). The production function of public services is as follows: 
 
,  0,  0,    ( 0,( ) )
ggS H HS S S S            (2.6) 
 
where the last assumption guarantees that not everyone will work in the production of the public good. In addition, 
the public good is a pure non-market output, thus it will not appear in the government budget constraint. 
The government runs a balanced budget: The public sector wage bill is financed by levying a lump-sum 
tax T on all households 
 
g gw H T .         (2.7) 
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In terms of fiscal instruments available at the government’s disposal, the government takes total public 
sector hours, Hg, as given, and sets the public sector wage rate, wg, as a fixed gross mark-up above the 
competitive wage rate. In a sense, the government faces a supply curve for labor in the public sector and 
determines the demand for government employees. Lump-sum taxes will be then residually chosen to guarantee 
that the budget is balanced. 
3. Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium  
Given the choice of T, a DCE is defined by allocations {c, hp, hg, S}, wage rates {wp, wg }, and firm’s profit 
π s.t (i) all households maximize utility; (ii) the private firm maximizes profit; (iii) the government budget constrain 
is balanced; (iv) all markets clear. 
4. Characterizing the DCE  
Given the restrictions imposed on the production functions in the private and public sector goods, it follows 
that not everyone will be employed in the private sector in the first stage. Therefore, everyone doing the same - 
working or not working in the first stage - is not an equilibrium. 
Proof: Case (1): For any positive and finite wage in the private sector, i.e. 0 < wp < ∞, both sectors will 
want to hire a bit of labor. Hence, hp = 0 cannot be an equilibrium because firm will have a positive labor demand 
for any finite wage, and households will have zero consumption, c = 0, which is ruled out as an optimal choice 
from the monotonicity of the logarithmic utility. 
Case (2): 
p
ph h  only if wp = 0, which follows from the assumptions on both production technologies. At 
such wage rates both the firm and government will want to hire everyone, but no household will want to supply 
any labor. Thus having everyone working is not optimal either. QED 
Denote the proportion of households employed in the private sector by q. The rest of the households, 1 − 
q, will go to the public sector to search for a job. Again, everyone working or not working in the second stage is 
not an equilibrium outcome. Thus, in the second stage, there will be a proportion   of those who remained 
unemployed after stage one, or (1 )q   of all households, that will be employed in the public sector. The 
proportion   will be chosen optimally to equate the utility of those who will be employed in the public sector, and 
those who will not. (This is a sort of rationing scheme, or a lottery.  We assume that the government cannot hire 
all the people who do not work in the private sector.) To achieve this, and to guarantee that this sequential choice 
is time-consistent, we have to solve the game backwards. In this way households who decide not to work in the 
private sector cannot end up getting less utility. Alternatively, the government knows q from the first stage, when it 
chooses ( )1 q  in the second stage that will equate the utilities of the all the three groups of individuals. In 
game-theoretic language, q is a best (Nash) response to   and   is a best (Nash) response to q. 
Hence, if there is a DCE, it must be that in equilibrium not everyone will get the same private consumption. 
Still, everyone consumes the same level of public good, as it is assumed to be non-excludable and non-rivalrous. 
The households that work will have higher utility of private consumption, while those who do not work will enjoy 
more utility from leisure. Lastly, every household belonging to the same type will enjoy the same level of total 
utility. 
Therefore, we will consider an equilibrium in which q of the people are employed in the private sector, and 
  of the people who go to public sector are employed in the second stage, 0   1 )  ( 1.q q      Thus, 
,  ( ) .1
pp ggH qh and H hq    
From the firm’s optimization problem, we obtain the expression for the competitive hourly wage 
 
) (
p pF qh w           (2.8) 
 
Hence, there will be positive economic profits amounting to 
 
( ) (   0)
p p p
F qh F qh qh       ,      (2.9) 
 
which follow from the assumption that the production function features decreasing returns to scale. Next, 
equilibrium government output is 
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1 
1 
1 
w 
 
1 
1( ) ),(
g
S S q h          (2.10) 
 
and lump-sum tax revenue equals 
 
( ) ( )1 1 1 ) .( ) (
g g gp pg h h h hT w q w q F q q             (2.11) 
 
Now we will show the existence of a unique pair (q, λ) ∈ (0, 1) × (0, 1) by analyzing a system of two non-
linear equations. Those equations use the equality of utility of those who work and those who do not in the same 
sector. Households in the private sector are indifferent between working or not working: 
 
 
  1  1   
 1
[( ( ) ( ) ( ) ) ( ( ( ) )) ] ( )
[( ( ) ( ) ) ( ( ( ) )) 1]
p p p p p g p
p p p g
ln F qh h F qh F qh qh T S q h ln h
ln F qh F qh qh T S q h ln
 
  
 
 
         
      
(2.12) 
 
Similarly, in the second stage, unemployed households are indifferent between working or not in the public 
sector 
 
 
[( ( ) ( ) ) ( ( ( 1  1
  
)
1 1
)) ] ( )
[( ( ) ( ) ) ( ( ( ) )) ]
g p p p g g
g
p p p g
ln w F qh F qh qh T S q h ln h
ln F qh F qh qh T q h ln
h
S
  
  
 
 
       
      

 (2.13) 
 
Substitute out the public sector wage rate with its equivalent expression from the government budget 
constraint 
 
( ) ( )  ).(
pg pw q w q F qh     (2.14) 
 
Then do the same for the lump-sum taxes to obtain 
 
,   1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
g pg gT q w q q hqh hF             (2.15) 
 
Next, proving existence and uniqueness of optimal (q, λ) ∈ (0, 1) × (0, 1) follows trivially from the Brower’s 
Fixed Point and the assumptions on the functional forms of utility and production functions. Note that there are a 
lot of equilibria (in terms of the ”names” of the people working), all of them with the same fraction of population q 
working in the private sector,  and λ(1 − q) working in the public sector. Let cj, cn, j = p, g denotes the private 
consumption of individuals that work in each sector, and those who do not. Note that those who do not work have 
not been selected to work in the private sector during the first stage, and then have remained unemployed after 
the second stage.  
Because of the presence of the public good and the non-convexities, the First Welfare Theorem does not 
hold, so this equilibrium is not PO. Therefore, there exists an alternative allocation that a SP could choose that 
can make everyone better off. More specifically, the Social Planner (SP) can improve upon the initial equilibrium 
allocation by giving each household a consumption level independent of the fact whether they worked or not. For 
example, giving everyone 
 
 1  ( ) )( )1 1(p g nc qc q c q c                       (2.16) 
 
is Pareto improving, as the new consumption allocation is feasible, and gives a higher utility in expected terms, 
hence perfect insurance is achieved. 
After equalizing private consumption across states, aggregate utility function becomes 
 
[ ] ( ) ( )1  1( )  1
p g
U ln c s q ln h q ln h            
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Notice that 
ppH gh , then /
ppq H h . Similarly, 1( ) g
gH hq  , then 1  ( ) /g gq H h   . 
Substitute those expressions into the utility function to obtain 
 
(1/ )[ ] p gU ln c s AH BH       
 
where A and B are functions of model parameters. As it turns out, the assumption of sequentiality does not 
change the form of the aggregate utility function obtained in Vasilev (2015a). 
Conclusions 
This paper explores the problem of non-convex labor supply decisions in an economy with both private 
and public sector jobs. In contrast to Vasilev (2015a), the sectoral labor choice is made in a sequential manner. 
Still, the micro-founded representation obtained from explicit aggregation over homogeneous individuals again 
features different disutility of labor across the two sectors. Thus, there is little merit in the timing of the sectoral 
non-convex labor choice. 
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